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I. Introduction 
Domestic violence has been an unfortunate fact of life for many 
women in this nation, one that traditionally has been addressed—or 
overlooked—by state and local law enforcement agencies.1 Troubled 
by the widespread, enduring problem that women have faced,2 in 
1994 Congress decided that the issue finally needed to be addressed 
at a federal level. Congress passed the eponymously named Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA)3 to deal with that long-standing prob-
 
 1. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 25–27 (1993); S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993); 
S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 33–34, 36–39 (1991); S. Rep. 101-545, at 27–33 (1990); Ronet 
Bachman & Linda E. Saltzman, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Violence Against Women 2 
(1995); Robert Rackham, Enumerated Limits, Normative Principles, and Congressional Overstepping: 
Why the Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act is Unconstitutional, 6 Wm. & Mary 
J. Women & L. 447, 451–52 (2000); Sarah B. Lawsky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of 
the Violence Against Women Act, 109 Yale L.J. 783, 783 (2000). The problem has been a 
longstanding one: 
Until the 20th century, our society effectively condoned family violence, following a 
common-law rule known as the “rule of thumb,” which barred a husband from “re-
straining a wife of her liberty by chastisement with a stick thicker than a man’s 
thumb.” This rule, originally intended to protect women from excessive violence, in 
fact led to reluctance on the part of government to interfere to protect women even 
where serious violence occurred. 
  The legacy of societal acceptance of family violence endures even today. In cas-
es where a comparable assault by a stranger on the street would lead to a lengthy jail 
them, [sic] a similar assault by a spouse will result neither in arrest nor in prosecu-
tion. For example, a 1989 study in Washington, DC, found that in over 85 percent of 
the family violence cases where a woman was found bleeding from wounds, police 
did not arrest her abuser. Moreover, family violence accounts for a significant num-
ber of murders in this country. One-third of all women who are murdered die at the 
hands of a husband or boyfriend. 
  National reporting agencies confirm the serious nature of this violence. Ac-
cording to the U.S. Department of Justice, one-third of domestic attacks, if reported, 
would be classified as felony rapes, robberies, or aggravated assaults. Of the remain-
ing two-thirds classified as simple assaults, almost one-half involved “bodily injury at 
least as serious as the injury inflicted in 90 percent of all robberies and aggravated as-
saults.” 
S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 41 (footnotes omitted). 
 2. Consider the following:  
Violence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more common than 
automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer deaths combined. As many as 4 million 
women a year are the victims of domestic violence Three out of four women will be 
the victim of a violent crime sometime during their life. 
S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 38 (footnotes omitted); see also S. Rep. No. 101-545 (1990). 
 3. The Violence Against Women Act was Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, §§ 40001–40703, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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lem.4 Among other things, the VAWA authorized a variety of federal-
ly funded programs, each of which must be reauthorized to receive 
tax dollars every few years.5 The last reauthorization has expired, so 
Congress must decide whether to renew the act. Each chamber of 
Congress has worked to complete that task and has passed a different 
bill reauthorizing the VAWA.6 
One of the important differences between the Senate and House 
bills lies in a new provision found only in the Senate bill. Section 904 
of Senate Bill 1925 would grant Indian tribal courts concurrent juris-
diction to adjudicate charges of domestic abuse filed against non-
Indians.7 According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, domestic 
 
 4. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Supreme Court discussed 
the act in Morrison and held a portion of the statute unconstitutional, on the ground that it ex-
ceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Morrison 
did not affect the funding provisions of the Act, which remain in effect. 
 5. See, e.g., the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R. 3355 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); id. at Tit. IV (the Violence Against 
Women Act); id at § 40121 (grants to combat violence against women); id. at § 200106 (grants); 
id. at §§ 40152, 40155–56 (same). For a partial list of such programs, see Julie Goldscheid, Gen-
der-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 Harv. 
Women’s L.J. 123, 123 n.2 (1999). 
 6. See S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 7. S. 1925, 112th Cong. (2012); see S. Rep. No. 112-153, at 7–11 (2012) (discussing the 
bill). The House Bill, H.R. 4970, 112th Cong. (2012), does not contain a similar provision. Sec-
tion 904 of Senate Bill 1925 provides as follows: 
Title II of Public Law 90-284 (25 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.) (commonly known as the 
‘‘Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968’’) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
Sec. 204. Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes of Domestic Violence. 
. . . . 
(b) Nature of the Criminal Jurisdiction.— 
(1) In General.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in addition 
to any power of self-government recognized and affirmed by sections 201 
and 203, the power of self-government of a participating tribe include the 
inherent power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to 
exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons. 
(2) Concurrent Jurisdiction.—The exercise of special domestic vio-
lence criminal jurisdiction by a participating tribe shall be concurrent with 
the jurisdiction of the United States, of a State, or of both. 
(3) Applicability. . . . 
. . . . 
S. 1925, 112th Cong. § 905 (2011). 
Section 2 of House Bill 6625, introduced December 3, 2012, adds the following: 
(4) Exceptions.— 
(A) Victim and Defendant Are Both Non-Indians.— 
(i) In General.— A participating tribe may not exercise special 
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over an alleged offense 
if neither the defendant nor the alleged victim is an Indian. 
  
BYU Journal of Public Law   [Vol. 27 
4 
abuse is a serious problem today on Indian reservations.8 Indian tribal 
courts can adjudicate criminal charges against members of the same 
tribe9 or a different one.10 The problem, however, is that a large 
number of domestic assaults against women tribal members are at-
tributable to non-Indians,11 and Indian tribal courts cannot exercise 
 
(ii) Definition of Victim.—In this subparagraph and with re-
spect to a criminal proceeding in which a participating tribe ex-
ercises special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction based on 
a violation of a protection order, the term “victim” means a 
person specifically protected by a protection order that the de-
fendant allegedly violated. 
(B) Defendant Lacks Ties to the Indian Tribe—A participat-
ing tribe may exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction 
over a defendant only if the defendant— 
(i) resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe; 
(ii) is employed in the Indian country of the participating tribe; 
or 
(iii) is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner of— 
(I) a member of the participating tribe; or 
(II) an Indian who resides in the Indian country of the 
participating tribe. 
(c) Criminal Conduct.—A participating tribe may exercise special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction over a defendant for criminal conduct that falls 
into one or more of the following categories: 
(1) Domestic Violence and Dating Violence.— An act of domestic 
violence or dating violence that occurs in the Indian country of the partic-
ipating tribe. 
(2) Violations of Protection Orders.—An act that— 
(A) occurs in the Indian country of the participating tribe; and 
(B) violates the relevant portion of a protection order that — 
(i) prohibits or provides protection against violent or threaten-
ing acts or harassment against, sexual violence against, contact 
or communication with, or physical proximity to, another per-
son; 
(ii) was issued against the defendant; 
(iii) is enforceable by the participating tribe; and 
(iv) is consistent with section 2265(b) of title 18, United States 
Code. 
H.R. 6625, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 112-153, at 7 (“Another significant focus of this reauthorization 
of VAWA is the crisis of violence against women in tribal communities. These women face rates 
of domestic violence and sexual assault far higher than the national average.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883). 
 10. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197–98 (2004). 
 11. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 112-153, at 8 (“This legislation . . . recogniz[es] limited concur-
rent tribal jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, convict, and sentence non–Indian persons who 
assault Indian spouses, intimate partners, or dating partners, or who violate protection orders, in 
Indian country.”). Consider the following: 
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jurisdiction over crimes committed by such offenders.12 Tribal courts, 
therefore, cannot provide a forum for prosecution of those cases. 
The Senate version of the VAWA reauthorization bill seeks to re-
dress that shortcoming.13 To allow tribal courts to provide an addi-
tional system in criminal domestic-violence cases, the Senate bill, for 
the first time, would grant those courts concurrent criminal jurisdic-
tion in a limited number of domestic-violence cases. By increasing 
the number of forums in which domestic-violence prosecutions could 
be brought, the Senate Judiciary Committee sought to protect wom-
en against being (re)victimized and to enable tribal courts to express 
their communities’ condemnation of this conduct.14 
That recommendation, however, proved controversial within the 
committee, with seven members voting against that section of the 
VAWA reauthorization bill.15 The debate between the majority and 
the dissent in the committee, which split along partisan lines, was 
over the wisdom of granting tribal courts such jurisdiction.16 The 
 
Another significant focus of this reauthorization of VAWA is the crisis of violence 
against women in tribal communities. These women face rates of domestic violence 
and sexual assault far higher than the national average. A regional survey conducted 
by University of Oklahoma researchers showed that nearly three out of five Native 
American women had been assaulted by their spouses or intimate partners, and a na-
tionwide survey found that one third of all American Indian women will be raped 
during their lifetimes. A study funded by the National Institute of Justice found that, 
on some reservations, Native American women are murdered at a rate more than ten 
times the national average. 
Id. at 7–8. 
 12. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
 13. The Senate Report stated that: 
This legislation bolsters existing efforts to confront the ongoing epidemic of violence 
on tribal land by expanding Federal law enforcement tools and recognizing limited 
concurrent tribal jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, convict, and sentence non-
Indian persons who assault Indian spouses, intimate partners, or dating partners, or 
who violate protections orders, in Indian country. 
S. Rep. No. 112-153, at 8 (2012). 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 7–8. 
 15. Compare S. Rep. No. 112-153 (supra note 7), at 7–11 (Majority Report), with id. at 
36–39 (minority views of Senators Grassley, Hatch, Kyl, and Cornyn), id. at 48–51 (minority 
views from Senators Kyl, Hatch, Sessions, and Coburn), and id. at 53–56 (minority views from 
Senators Coburn and Lee). 
 16. The Senate Report further stated that: 
According to Census Bureau data, well over 50 percent of all Native American wom-
en are married to non-Indian men, and thousands of others are in intimate relation-
ships with non-Indians. Tribes do not currently have the authority to prosecute non-
Indian offenders even though they live on Indian land with Native women. Prosecut-
ing these crimes is left largely to Federal law enforcement officials who may be hours 
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majority emphasized the need for additional tribunals to handle do-
mestic-violence crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians, 
while the dissenters voiced two concerns. One is that non-Indians are 
not, and cannot be, members of the tribe that would exercise jurisdic-
tion over them, so that remitting non-Indians to courts defined by 
race transgressed equal-protection policies.17 The other criticism was 
that the Bill of Rights guarantees do not directly apply to tribal 
courts, and those tribunals lack the experience in providing the statu-
tory rights guaranteed to criminal defendants.18 Despite that disa-
greement, the committee passed Senate Bill 1925 on a strict party 
line vote, and the full Senate later voted to endorse that bill and sent 
it to the House of Representatives.19 
In the meantime, the House was also considering legislation to 
reauthorize the VAWA. Rather than take up the Senate bill, the 
House passed its own, separate VAWA reauthorization bill, House 
Bill 4970.20 As relevant here, the House bill differs from the Senate 
bill because House Bill 4970 does not contain any similar provision 
to enlarge the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts.21 Unless one 
chamber concedes to the other’s proposal, the Senate and House 
must reconcile the competing bills, or else the VAWA programs will 
not be authorized to receive or spend federal funds. The practical 
question is, “What will Congress do?” The policy issue is, “Which 
provision better advances the public welfare?” 
 
away and are often without the tools or resources needed to appropriately respond to 
domestic violence crimes while also addressing large-scale drug trafficking, orga-
nized crime, and terrorism cases. As a result, non-Indian offenders regularly go un-
punished, and their violence continues. Domestic violence is often an escalating 
problem, and currently, minor and midlevel offenses are not addressed, with Federal 
authorities only able to step in when violence has reached catastrophic levels. This 
leaves victims tremendously vulnerable and contributes to the epidemic of violence 
against Native women. 
S. Rep. No. 112-153, supra note 7, at 9. 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 36–37 (minority views of Senators Grassley, Hatch, Kyl, and Cornyn). 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 37–38 (minority views of Senators Grassley, Hatch, Kyl, and Cornyn). 
In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303, in order to give 
tribal defendants some of the same protections afforded to defendants tried in federal and state 
courts. The Supreme Court held in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), that the Bill of Rights 
applies only to the federal government and does not apply to proceedings in tribal courts. 
 19. See Cong. Rec. S2370–86 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2012). 
 20. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-480, pt. 1 (2012). 
 21. See id. at 3–47 (reprinting House bill); id. at 244–45 (dissenting views criticizing 
House Judiciary Committee majority for rejecting the tribal jurisdiction provisions of the Sen-
ate bill). 
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An essential consideration to the latter question is whether one 
bill or the other would violate the Constitution. Indians, tribes, and 
tribal courts occupy a unique position in our constitutional system in 
several ways. Tribes existed before the Constitution went into effect. 
For that reason, the Constitution and Bill of Rights do not apply to 
Indian tribes.22 Moreover, Article I of the Constitution gives the fed-
eral government plenary authority to regulate commerce with the In-
dian tribes.23 Indian tribes, however, no longer occupy the same posi-
tion that they enjoyed in 1793. During the westward expansion of the 
United States from states hugging the eastern seaboard, the federal 
government engaged in military conquest of the remaining lands in 
the continental United States, a portion of which had been occupied 
by Indian tribes for centuries. Over time, the Supreme Court ex-
panded Congress’ Article I power from the authority to regulate 
commerce with Indian tribes to the ability to regulate every aspect of 
their interaction with the non-Indians who settled the United 
States.24 That power now includes the authority to define the crimi-
nal jurisdiction of the tribal courts over Indians and non-Indians.25 
In the exercise of that authority, various presidents have negotiat-
ed treaties with different tribes, the Senate has approved those trea-
ties, and the President and Congress have created numerous federal 
laws regulating the tribes. The law governing tribal criminal jurisdic-
tion, however, is not nearly as neat and clean as the comparable law 
applicable in the federal courts.26 Instead, tribal jurisdiction is “a 
 
 22. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383–84 (1896); see also, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56–57 & n.7 (1978) (collecting cases). 
 23. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]”). 
 24. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55–56 (citations omitted) (“Indian tribes are 
‘distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights’ in matters of 
local self-government. . . . Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the 
powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.”). 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (Congress can vest tribal 
courts with jurisdiction over Indian non-tribal members); see generally Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (discussing the criminal jurisdictional aspects of various trea-
ties). The relationship between tribal jurisdiction and federal or state jurisdiction is a complex 
one. See Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Concurrent Tribal Authority 
Under Public Law 83–280 (Nov. 9, 2000), available at http://www.tribal-
institute.org/lists/concurrent_tribal.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). 
 26. The general rule is that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all 
crimes against the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 2338 (2012) (“The district courts of the Unit-
ed States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over an action brought under this chapter.”). Of 
course, Congress always can create exceptions by statute. 
  
BYU Journal of Public Law   [Vol. 27 
8 
complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.”27 One or more of 
those governments can exercise exclusive or concurrent criminal ju-
risdiction in any particular case, depending on the state, tribe, and 
crime involved.28 Section 904 of Senate Bill 1925 would modify the 
existing framework and, in the process, raise serious policy issues re-
garding the proper allocation of judicial authority, as seen in the dif-
ferent views expressed by members of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.29 Section 904 of Senate Bill 1925 also raises some constitutional 
concerns that must be addressed. The reason is that Section 904 
would empower a tribal court to enter a judgment that authorizes in-
carceration of a convicted offender. Because it is an act of Congress 
that would justify confinement, Congress must comply with whatever 
restrictions the Constitution imposes on the power of federal law. 
The Constitution does not apply to Indian tribal governments,30 but 
it quite clearly applies to Congress. A decision by Congress to em-
power tribal courts to enter judgment in a criminal case against a 
non-Indian raises questions under the Appointments Clause of Arti-
cle II,31 as well as the Judicial Vesting and Power Clauses of Article 
III.32 The reasons are twofold: the tribes select judges for tribal 
courts, even though the Constitution requires that the President 
(sometimes with the advice and consent of the Senate), a “Court of 
Law,” or the “Head of a Department” appoint any official who exer-
 
 27. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990) (“Jurisdiction in ‘Indian country,’ 
which is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, see United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648–649 (1978), is 
governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law. For enumerated major felo-
nies, such as murder, rape, assault, and robbery, federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
an Indian is provided by 18 U.S.C. § 1153, commonly known as the Indian Major Crimes 
Act . . . .”). Federal law defines “Indian country” as follows: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, includ-
ing rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian commu-
nities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subse-
quently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a 
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151. 
 28. See B.J. Jones, Role of Indian Tribal Courts in the Justice System (2000). 
 29. See supra note 18. 
 30. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383–84 (1896); see also, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56–57 & n.7 (1978) (collecting cases). 
 31. See infra notes 84–114. 
 32. See infra notes 115–71. 
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cises the power of the federal government.33 In addition, tribal judges 
lack the life tenure and salary protection enjoyed by Article III judg-
es,34 protections that historically have been deemed necessary to en-
sure a judge is not susceptible to outside pressure.35 On its face, 
therefore, Section 904 does not satisfy any of those requirements, and 
the Senate Report on the VAWA reauthorization bill does not address 
them.36 
To be sure, no senator who objected to Section 904 raised such a 
complaint or questioned the premise of the proposed legislation: 
namely, that Congress could vest federal criminal jurisdiction in tribal 
courts over non-Indians.37 The absence of such an objection, howev-
er, does not necessarily indicate that the dissenting members of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee saw no such flaw in Section 904. Their 
failure to object on this ground could be due to the fact that the 
committee did not hold a hearing on this aspect of the bill.38 Regard-
 
 33. As one commentator has noted: 
The education and selection of tribal court judges is as varied as the tribes them-
selves. Many tribal councils appoint judges to serve for discrete terms. Some tribes 
choose tribal judges by popular election. Some tribes use a mixed system; the tribal 
council of the Navajo tribe, for example, which has jurisdiction over close to half of 
the Indian population subject to tribal courts, appoints its judges for terms of two or 
three years. If, at the end of that period, the tribal council affirms the appointment, 
the judge serves for life. 
Gordon K. Wright, Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1397, 
1403 (1985) (citations omitted). Compare U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (only the President, 
courts of law, or heads of departments may appoint federal officials), with infra notes 80–83. 
 34. Federal judges hold office during their “good behavior.” U.S. Const. art. III, §1. 
Tribal judges do not enjoy life tenure, see Wright, supra note 33, at 1403, and the Senate bill 
does not purport to grant tribal judges any tenure, let alone life tenure. See infra note 90. 
 35. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011). 
 36. See S. Rep. No. 112-153 (2012). 
 37. See id. at 36–56. 
 38. Compare id. at 9 (Majority Report), with id. at 37–38 (minority Views of Senators 
Grassley, Hatch, Kyl, and Cornyn). The Senate Indian Affairs Committee had held a hearing on 
such a measure in 2011, but the Senate Judiciary Committee did not. Id. at 8–9. 
Another explanation could be that Congress had enacted related legislation in 1990 and 
1991. In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Supreme Court held that an Indian tribal court 
could not exercise jurisdiction over a member of a different tribe. In response, Congress includ-
ed a provision in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1991, that temporarily sought 
to permit tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction over any Indian. See Pub. L. No. 101-511, Title 
VIII, § 8077(b), (c), 104 Stat. 1892 (1990). The following year, Congress made that temporary 
provision permanent. See Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991). In United States v. Lara, 
541 U.S. 193 (2004), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that successive prosecutions by 
a tribe and the United States violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court did not resolve, 
address, or even note the existence of possible Article II and III issues raised by those acts of 
Congress. 
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less of why no one raised a separation of powers objection to the Sen-
ate bill, it makes little sense to enact it if Section 904 is unconstitu-
tional on that ground.39 
 
 39. Aside from Article II and III issues, the bill also could pose a question under the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause. See Tom Gede, Criminal Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes: Should 
Non-Indians Be Subject to Tribal Criminal Authority under VAWA, 13 Engage 40 (July 2012). It is 
true that more than a century ago, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights guarantees do 
not apply to the Indian tribes—including tribal courts. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383–
84 (1896). Over the last eighty years, however, the Supreme Court has incorporated, through 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, virtually every provision in the Bill of Rights 
applicable to the federal criminal process to the state criminal justice systems. See McDonald v. 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3031–36 (2010) (collecting cases). The question that the Court asked 
is “‘whether a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liber-
ty and system of justice,’” id. at 3034 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, n.14 
(1968)), and, with few exceptions, the Court has answered that question in the affirmative. (The 
Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause, the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Clause guarantee of a 
unanimous verdict, and the Eighth Amendment Bail Clause are the exceptions. See Apodaca v. 
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (Jury Trial Clause does not require unanimity in state prosecu-
tions); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (Grand Jury Clause does not apply to the 
states). It would be odd for Congress to be able to disregard procedural guarantees that are 
“fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice” simply because Congress 
is exercising its power to regulate our relations with Indian tribes. Congress has sought by stat-
ute to require tribal courts to provide the identical rights that the U.S. Constitution guarantees 
criminal defendants in federal or state court. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–02 (2012). Some differ-
ences, however, remain. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 57 (1978) (the provi-
sions in the Indian Civil Rights Act are “similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.”); S. Rep. No. 112-153, at 10 (2012) (noting that, 
under current law, “tribes would be required to protect effectively the same Constitutional rights 
as guaranteed in State court criminal proceedings,” because federal statutes “protect individual 
liberties and constrain the power of tribal governments in much the same ways that the Constitu-
tion limits the powers of Federal and State governments.” (emphasis added)). 
At least one difference may be important. A defendant convicted in a tribal court cannot 
appeal to a federal circuit court; instead, he must petition a federal district court for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2011) (federal circuit courts have appellate jurisdic-
tion over “all final decisions of the district courts of the United States”), with 25 U.S.C. § 1303 
(2011) (A writ of habeas corpus is available “to any person, in a court of the United States, to 
test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.”); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67 
(“habeas corpus [is] the exclusive means for federal–court review of tribal criminal proceed-
ings.”). There is a material difference between relief available on direct appeal and that available 
in collateral attack on a judgment because some claims may be raised only on direct appeal, not 
in a habeas corpus proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979) 
(“It has, of course, long been settled law that an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal 
will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.”); see also id. at 186–90 (de-
fendant cannot raise a claim on collateral attack where the judge miscalculated his probable pa-
role release date when fixing his sentence); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979) 
(same, where Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 was violated when defendant pleaded guilty); Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) (same, where Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a) was violated when defendant 
allocuted before sentence was imposed); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) (same, where de-
fendants failed to assert a defense that was later accepted by courts). A defendant’s inability to 
seek direct review from a tribal court judgment is a serious detriment to trial in an Indian court. 
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The discussion below contains three parts, beginning with Part 
II. Part II discusses the Indian tribal court system. Part III discusses 
the issues that the Senate bill poses under Article II of the Constitu-
tion. The last part, Part IV, outlines the twists and turns of the Su-
preme Court’s Article III case law and then analyzes the Senate bill in 
light of the teaching of those cases. 
II. The Indian Tribal Court System 
A. The Intersection of Federal and Tribal Criminal Law 
The Constitution empowers Congress to regulate commerce 
with the “Indian Tribes,”40 and Congress has plenary authority to 
regulate both the tribes themselves and the nation’s relationship with 
them.41 Congress exercised that authority early in this nation’s life.42 
 
See Wright, supra note 33, at 1415 (“Because of weak or nonexistent appellate procedures in 
most tribes, most tribal courts remain unaccountable to anyone.”). It may be possible that fed-
eral courts would expand the relief available to a defendant convicted in tribal court to offset 
the absence of the right to trial by an appeal to an Article III court. If not, the rights accorded a 
defendant forced to stand trial for spousal abuse in tribal court would be less than the rights 
accorded a defendant charged in federal district court. 
 40. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324 (2011) (col-
lecting cases stating that Congress has plenary authority over the tribes); Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 169 n.18 (1982) (“The United States retains plenary authority to 
divest the tribes of any attributes of sovereignty.”); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56–57. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe: 
[T]he tribes’ retained powers are not such that they are limited only by specific re-
strictions in treaties or congressional enactments. . . . Indian tribes are prohibited 
from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminat-
ed by Congress and those powers “inconsistent with their status.” Indian reservations 
are “a part of the territory of the United States.” Indian tribes “hold and occupy [the 
reservations] with the assent of the United States, and under their authority.” Upon 
incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come 
under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate 
power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding sover-
eignty. “[T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] neces-
sarily diminished.” 
435 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1978) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). See also Cotton Petrol. 
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 
(1913); Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 
445, 483–88 (1899); Talton, 163 U.S. at 379–80 (“[T]he right of the Cherokee nation to exist as 
an autonomous body” is “subject always to the paramount authority of the United States.”); 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17–18 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823). 
 42. 1 Stat. 137 (1790). As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 
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Congress also sought early on to use the criminal law to regulate the 
nation’s relationship with the tribes.43 In 1817, Congress enacted the 
Indian Country Crimes Act,44 the first federal criminal law governing 
conduct of non-Indians in “Indian Country.”45 Under that statute, if 
the conduct would amount to a federal offense in the United States 
proper, that conduct could be punished as provided by federal law.46 
 
Wheat.) 543 (1823): 
  The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great and broad 
rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country. They hold, and assert in 
themselves, the title by which it was acquired. They maintain, as all others have 
maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of oc-
cupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of 
sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise. 
Id. at 587. 
 43. Professor Philip P. Frickey has described the basic Indian law principles as follows: 
In the early nineteenth century, the Marshall Court developed most of the founda-
tional principles of federal Indian law in a trio of cases. In Johnson v. McIntosh, 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court concluded that, upon “discovery” by 
Europeans, tribes lost their status as complete sovereigns and, in particular, their 
ability to engage in external relations with any sovereign other than the European 
discovering country. Marshall then explained, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, that 
although tribes had no sovereignty in an international sense, they retained some gov-
ernmental authority within the United States. Marshall labeled the tribes “domestic 
dependent nations” in a relationship with the United States that “resembles that of a 
ward to his guardian.” Finally, in Worcester v. Georgia—the most important deci-
sion in federal Indian law—Marshall concluded that, because the federal-tribal rela-
tionship was exclusive, states had no role in Indian country. Marshall analogized the 
relationship between tribes and the United States to that between a weaker sovereign 
and a stronger, supporting sovereign under international law. To be sure, a tribe 
could cede away power or property by treaty, but Marshall adopted canons of inter-
pretation that require clarity before courts may conclude that a tribe has in fact given 
up valuable rights. Absent any clear treaty cession or congressional act, a tribe re-
tained territorial sovereignty over its reservation. 
Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian 
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1, 9–10 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
 44. An Act to Provide for the Punishment of Crimes and Offences Committed within 
the Indian Boundaries , ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383 (1817) [hereinafter Indian Country Crimes Act] (cur-
rent codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012)). 
 45. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indians, and to Preserve Peace on 
the Frontier [hereinafter Indian Intercourse Act of 1834], ch. 161, Pub. L. No. 23–161, 4 Stat. 
729, 730 (current codification at 25 U.S.C. § 177), would later define “Indian country” as: 
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states 
of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and also that part of the 
United States east of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the In-
dian title has not been extinguished. 
Id. 
 46. Indian Country Crimes Act, supra note 44. 
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Ex parte Crow Dog47 was the watershed case that forever altered 
the intersection of Indian and federal criminal law. Crow Dog was a 
Brule Sioux who was convicted of killing Spotted Tail, another Brule 
Sioux.48 The case was initially settled under traditional Brule Sioux 
dispute resolution traditions, resulting in a punishment of restitu-
tion.49 But the case did not end there. The Territorial District Court 
of Dakota claimed jurisdiction over the case, possibly for political 
reasons.50 Crow Dog was found guilty and sentenced to death.51 A 
month before his scheduled execution, the Supreme Court intervened 
and granted Crow Dog’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.52 
Critical to the Court’s analysis in Ex parte Crow Dog were Sec-
tions 2145 and 2146 of the Revised Statutes.53 Section 2145, like the 
Indian Country Crimes Act, extended federal criminal jurisdiction to 
offenses committed in Indian country.54 Section 2146, however, cre-
ated an exception for crimes committed by one Indian against the 
person or property of another.55 The Court found that the Brule 
Sioux land where the murder occurred was Indian country that fell 
within the jurisdiction of the Dakota district court.56 Thus, Crow 
Dog could, presumptively, be prosecuted and convicted under Re-
vised Statute Section 2145. The Court then concluded, however, that 
Crow Dog’s case also met the exception in Section 2146 for crimes 
involving only Indians.57 The Court also rejected the argument that 
the 1868 treaty between the United States and the Sioux, along with 
 
 47. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 48. Id. at 557. The Brule Sioux are a sub-tribe of the Lakota Nation. Kul Wicasa Oyate 
[Lower Brule Sioux Tribe], http://www.lbst.org/newsite/home.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 
2012). They are sometimes referred to by their larger tribal identification, but are identified as 
Brule Sioux in this paper. 
 49. Jones, supra note 28, at 3. 
 50. See Timothy Connors & Vivek Sankaran, Crow Dog vs. Spotted Tail: Case Closed?, 
Mich. Bar J., July 2010, at 36. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 1 Rev. Statutes of the United States Passed at the Session of the Forty-
Third Congress 1873–74, at 374 (2d ed., U.S. Gvm’t Prtg. Off. 1878). 
 54. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 558–61 (1883). 
 55. Id. There also were other exceptions for cases in which the tribe had already imposed 
punishment pursuant to local tribal law or in which a treaty granted a tribe exclusive jurisdic-
tion over an offense. Id. at 558. 
 56. Id. at 561–62. In reaching that conclusion, the Court found instructive the definition 
of the term “Indian country” in the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834 (see supra, note 38), though 
Congress had previously repealed that statute. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 560–61. 
 57. Id. at 562. 
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implementing federal legislation,58 repealed that exemption.59 The 
historical presumption in American law, the Court concluded, was to 
leave to the Indian tribes the authority to resolve crimes committed 
between Indians, and neither the treaty nor the legislation required a 
different result.60 
B. The Post-Crow Dog Creation of Tribal Courts 
The Crow Dog decision sparked congressional legislation that 
changed the course of the legal relationship between the United 
States and the Indian tribes with respect to the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction.61 Five statutes are particularly relevant. 
In 1817, Congress adopted the first of those statutes, the General 
Crimes Act,62 which created federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes 
between Indians and non-Indians. Crimes involving only Indians re-
mained within the exclusive jurisdiction of tribal governments. The 
second law, the Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885, brought serious of-
fenses such as murder, rape, arson, robbery, and burglary under feder-
al authority.63 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) was the 
 
 58. See Treaty with the Sioux Indians, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635. 
 59. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 562–67. 
 60. The Court explained that: 
The provisions now contained in §§ 2145 and 2146 of the Revised Statutes were first 
enacted in § 25 of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834, 4 Stat. 733. Prior to that, by 
the act of 1796, 1 Stat. 479, and the act of 1802, 2 Stat. 139, offences committed by 
Indians against white persons and by white persons against Indians were specifically 
enumerated and defined, and those by Indians against each other were left to be dealt 
with by each tribe for itself, according to its local customs. The policy of the gov-
ernment in that respect has been uniform. . .To give to the clauses in the treaty of 
1868 and the agreement of 1877 effect, so as to uphold the jurisdiction exercised in 
this case, would be to reverse in this instance the general policy of the government 
towards the Indians, as declared in many statutes and treaties, and recognized in 
many decisions of this court, from the beginning to the present time. To justify such 
a departure, in such a case, requires a clear expression of the intention of Congress, 
and that we have not been able to find. 
Id. at 571–72. 
 61. The Federal Government has exclusive authority over Indian affairs. See Bryan v. 
Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976). A result of that principle is that states cannot prose-
cute Indians for crimes committed within so-called “Indian country” without Congressional 
authorization. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962). 
 62. Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 92, § 1–3, 3 Stat. 383 (1917). It is alternatively known as 
the Indian Country Crimes Act. The descendent statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
 63. Act of March 3, 1885 [hereinafter Indian Major Crimes Act], ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 
(1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2011)); see Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 702 
(1990); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding the constitutionality of the 
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third statute. It empowered tribes to create their own tribal courts.64 
In the 1950s, concerned about a lack of law enforcement services in 
many areas of Indian country, Congress enacted the fourth piece of 
legislation, commonly known as “Public Law 280.”65 Public Law 280 
required six states to assume criminal (and civil) jurisdiction over all 
or part of Indian country within those states and provided that the 
General Crimes Act and the Major Crimes Act shall not apply within 
those areas of Indian country.66 Public Law 280 also authorized other 
states voluntarily to assume criminal (or civil) jurisdiction over Indian 
country,67 but the federal government retained concurrent jurisdic-
tion to prosecute offenders under the Major Crimes Act and General 
Crimes Act in this second category of states.68 Finally, in 2010 Con-
gress gave tribal courts greater sentencing power under the Tribal 
Law and Order Act.69 In the case of tribal felonies, tribal courts can 
now impose a penalty of up to three years imprisonment and a 
$15,000 fine.70 Previously, tribal courts could not impose a penalty 
greater than one year’s imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, which led 
tribes to pass along serious crimes to the federal system.71 Important-
 
Indian Major Crimes Act); Jones, supra note 28, at 3 n.9. 
 64. Act of June 18, 1934 [hereinafter Indian Reorganization Act], Pub. L. No. 73–383, 48 
Stat. 985 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.); Id. at 3–4. These courts primarily were 
components of tribal governing bodies, rather than separate, co-equal branches of tribal gov-
ernment. Jones, supra note 28, at 4. Not all tribes operate their own judicial system. Instead, 
they maintain courts authorized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, colloquially known as “CFR 
courts,” because they must follow the rules and procedures outlined in the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR). Id. at 4. For a list of those courts, see 25 C.F.R. 11.100. 
 65. Act of Aug. 15, 1953 [hereinafter Public Law 280], Pub. L. No. 83–280, 67 Stat. 588 
(1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326; 28 U.S.C. § 1360); see Bryan, 426 
U.S. at 379–80. 
 66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)–(c) (2012). 
 67. See generally Wash. v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). 
 68. See Jones, supra note 28, at 5. The Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs, www.bia.gov, also has established Courts of Indian Offenses to prosecute lesser crimes. 
Significantly, non-Indians must expressly consent in order to be subject to the jurisdiction of 
these courts. Id. at 3; see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 n.7 (1978) 
(“The CFR Courts are the offspring of the Courts of Indian Offenses, first provided for in the 
Indian Department Appropriations Act of 1888, 25 Stat. 217, 233. See W. Hagan, Indian Police 
and Judges (1966). By regulations issued in 1935, the jurisdiction of CFR Courts is restricted to 
offenses committed by Indians within the reservation. 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(a) (1977).”). 
 69. Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010). 
 70. Id. at § 234. 
 71. Jones, supra note 28, at 7. Some believe that this change is an indication of an im-
proved perception of Indian tribal courts. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Kronk, American Indian Tribal 
Courts as Models for Incorporating Customary Law, 3 J. Ct. Innovation 231, 241–242 (2010). 
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ly, none of those statutes authorized a tribal court to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian.72 
C. The Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Non-Indians 
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,73 the Supreme Court held 
that Indian tribes do not inherently possess criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. The Court found that all of the available objective evi-
dence on the issue pointed in that direction,74 as did the fact that for 
most of our history tribes had no formal judicial system.75 After doing 
so, the Court found no indication that tribes could exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians without an express congressional dele-
gation.76 For example, in the 19th century the Choctaw Indian Tribe 
specifically requested authority to prosecute “any white man” who 
violated tribal rules.77 Congress granted that request in an 1830 trea-
ty with the tribe, but the terms of that grant imply that the power to 
prosecute non-Indians was not one assumed to be inherently within 
the tribe’s jurisdiction.78 Congressional legislation in the early- to 
mid-1800s also suggested that Indians did not have this jurisdiction.79 
 
 72. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 n.6 (1978). Contemporary 
tribal courts often use traditional tribal dispute resolution methods, including “Peacemaking” 
and “Sentencing Circles,” which are similar to the methods used by the Brule Sioux Tribe in the 
Crow Dog case. Jones, supra note 28, at 3 (citing Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883)). Oth-
er tribes still maintain the framework for judicial systems as provided by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, because by the time Indians were given the right to create these systems in 1934, few 
were familiar with the traditional forms of dispute resolution. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons 
from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 Tulsa L.J. 1, 1–2 (1997). There is considerable 
diversity in the jurisdiction, structure, and procedures that apply in tribal courts. Unless the 
tribe operates under a court created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, there is no way to easily 
determine the jurisdiction, structure, and procedures used by a given tribe’s judicial system. 
 73. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212. 
 74. Id. at 196–211 (canvassing treaties between the Federal Government and the Indian 
tribes, congressional reports, opinions of the Attorney General, treatises on Indian law, etc.). 
 75. Id. at 197 (“Until the middle of this century, few Indian tribes maintained any sem-
blance of a formal court system. Offenses by one Indian against another were usually handled 
by social and religious pressure and not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was on restitu-
tion rather than on punishment. In 1834 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs described the then 
status of Indian criminal systems: ‘With the exception of two or three tribes, who have within a 
few years past attempted to establish some few laws and regulations among themselves, the In-
dian tribes are without laws, and the chiefs without much authority to exercise any restraint.’” 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 474, at 91 (1834))). 
 76. Id. at 204. 
 77. Id. at 197 (citing Art. 4, 7 Stat. 333). 
 78. Id. at 197–99. 
 79. Id. at 201–04. 
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Other presumptions against inherent sovereignty over non-Indians 
also “carrie[d] considerable weight.”80 Accordingly, the Court held 
that tribes could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
unless Congress specifically grants tribes that authority.81 The teach-
ing of Oliphant is that tribal courts are not courts of general criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians and are limited to the jurisdiction ex-
pressly conferred on them by Congress.82 Prosecutions can be 
brought against non-Indians only in federal or state court.83 
III. Article II Issues Raised by Senate Bill 1925 
A. The Appointments Clause 
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution84 creates two 
mechanisms for appointment of all “Officers of the United States,”85 
 
 80. Id. at 206. 
 81. Id. at 212. The Court later held that tribes also lack inherent authority to prosecute 
members of a different tribe. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695–96 (1990). Following Oli-
phant, the Court decided Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), which ruled there 
were only two conditions in which tribes possess inherent sovereign power in the case of non-
member activity that occurred on non-tribal lands within the tribal territory. First, tribes can 
regulate nonmember activity if there is a consensual relationship between the tribe and the 
nonmember. Second, tribes can use their civil authority against nonmembers if the conduct of 
the nonmember is a threat to or will directly affect “the political integrity, the economic securi-
ty, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 565–66. Fee lands within the Crow Nation were 
at issue here, and that could affect the result of domestic-violence disputes as well, not only be-
cause of the consideration and potential inconsistency of prosecutions based on individual land 
ownership, but also for a determination as to what constitutes a threat or effect on the safety of 
the tribe. Montana has, however, proved beneficial for tribes when dealing with the large com-
mercial activities of nonmembers within tribal territory. 
 82. Jones, supra note 28, at 6; see also, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 
(1978) (“[T]he sovereign power of a tribe to prosecute its members for tribal offenses clearly 
does not fall within that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their 
dependent status. The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to 
have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the 
tribe.”). 
 83. Id. at 6–7. Some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in Oli-
phant. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 43, at 34–39; Gede, supra note 30, at 44 n.2 (collecting au-
thorities). The Supreme Court, however, has not signaled that it would reconsider its decision. 
 84. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution provides as follows: 
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . . 
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 85. “In light of ‘[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great 
business of the State,’ the Constitution provides for executive officers to ‘assist the supreme 
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a term that includes any person who exercises the power of the feder-
al government.86 With the advice and consent of the Senate, the 
President can appoint what have come to be known as “Superior Of-
ficers.” The President also can appoint “Inferior Officers” in the 
same manner, but Congress can delegate their appointment to the 
President alone, the courts, or heads of departments.87 
The appointment process is not a bureaucratic technicality.88 In-
stead, like other aspects in our tripartite system of designated and 
separated powers, the Appointments Clause protects liberty by regu-
lating the personnel who may exercise the federal government’s au-
thority.89 The clause accomplishes that mission in several ways. It 
lodges the appointment power in one person or agency, which forces 
the appointing authority to be responsible for the choice by avoiding 
diffusion of responsibility.90 It protects the appointing authority 
against interference from any other person or branch of the federal 
 
Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.’” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 131 S. Ct. 3138, 3146 (2010) (quoting 30 Writings of George Washington 
334 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939)). Moreover, “[a]s Madison stated on the floor of the First Congress, 
‘if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and 
controlling those who execute the laws.’” Id. at 3157 (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 463 (1789)). 
 86. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (“[A]ny appointee exercising significant 
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the United States,’ and 
must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by [the Appointments Clause].”); see 
also, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 
880–83 (1991); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 
163, 169–70 (1994). 
 87. On the meaning of the terms “Superior Officers” and “Inferior Officers,” as well as 
the differences between them, see Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516–17 (1920); Ed-
mond, 520 U.S. at 661–66; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882–83; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 
282 U.S. 344, 352–53 (1931); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879). 
 88. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125). 
 89. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3157; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721–22, 
730 (1986); Edmond, 520 U.S. at 658; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 (“The Appointments Clause pre-
vents Congress from dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients of 
the power to appoint.”). 
 90. See Free Enter. Fund: 
The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability. The people do 
not vote for the “Officers of the United States.” They instead look to the President 
to guide the “assistants or deputies . . . subject to his superintendence.” Without a 
clear and effective chain of command, the public cannot “determine on whom the 
blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures 
ought really to fall.” That is why the Framers sought to ensure that “those who are 
employed in the execution of the law will be in their proper situation, and the chain 
of dependence be preserved; the lowest officers, the middle grade, and the highest, 
will depend, as they ought, on the President, and the President on the community.” 
130 S. Ct. at 3155 (citations omitted). 
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government. It guarantees that only parties who have been properly 
appointed and therefore (presumably) properly vetted can exercise 
federal power.91 Finally, it ensures that any official exercising federal 
power can be removed at a minimum for misconduct or incompe-
tence, even if not for other reasons.92 
The general rule is that one of the bodies identified in Article 
II—whether the President, the courts of law, or the heads of depart-
ments—has the prerogative to appoint or remove federal officers. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States93 is the land-
mark case explaining why. Myers reasoned that because Article II ex-
pressly confers on the President the responsibility to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed,”94 the article is best read as implicitly 
authorizing the President to remove whatever personnel he is re-
sponsible for supervising.95 As a result, restrictions on the President’s 
unfettered ability to appoint or remove federal officers generally are 
invalid.96 
The First Congress believed that the Article II Appointments 
Clause was an important feature of the new constitution. Hard on the 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, Congress amended the North-
west Ordinance97 to ensure that President Washington would ap-
point officials in that territory, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.98 Congress followed that understanding of the Constitution 
for the next 150 years. Every statute enacted before 1947 and estab-
lishing a territorial government “provided for direct control by the 
executive branch, usually through a presidentially appointed gover-
 
 91. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); see also id. at 483–
84 & n.4 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting The Federalist No. 76, at 455–56 (A. Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 92. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146–47. 
 93. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 94. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
 95. Myers, 272 U.S. at 164. 
 96. See, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 
(1976); Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146–47, 3157; Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 483–84 & n.4 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). In theory, the same principle should apply if Congress vests appoint-
ment power in one of the other authorities in Article II, so a court of law or the head of a de-
partment should have the ability to appoint or remove federal officers as the President does 
when Senate confirmation is unnecessary. 
 97. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-west of the 
River Ohio (July 13, 1787), reprinted in 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789). 
 98. Id. 
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nor.”99 
B. The Proposed Expansion of Indian Tribal Court Jurisdiction and Article 
II 
Given that design, the vesting of criminal jurisdiction in tribal 
courts raises serious questions under the Appointments Clause. Be-
cause Indian tribes lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians,100 tribal courts cannot issue a judgment in a criminal case 
against any such person, and tribal courts especially cannot enter a 
judgment ordering a person’s imprisonment. The Senate bill would 
grant tribal courts that authority, but in so doing, the Senate bill ef-
fectively would make tribal judges “officers of the United States” for 
Article II purposes.101 The authority to imprison a person for convic-
tion of a federal offense102—one of the most intrusive actions that the 
government can take against anyone—is an archetypical example of 
the exercise of government power that can only be exercised by a per-
son properly appointed under Article II.103 
 
 99. Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 
853, 868 (1990). The law governing territories was set forth in a series of cases known as the 
Insular Cases, where a series of Supreme Court decisions deciding whether island territories ac-
quired by the United States after the Spanish-American War were “territories” for purposes of 
Article IV and what, if any, constitutional provisions applied in those lands. See De Lima v. Bid-
well, 182 U.S. 1, 2 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (Puerto Rico); Fourteen Di-
amond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901) (Philippines); Goetze v. United States, 182 
U.S. 221 (1901) (Hawaiian Islands). The rule seems to be that “territories” are not “part” of the 
United States even though they are subject to the “jurisdiction” of the nation. See Downes, 182 
U.S. at 257–59, 262–63. 
Oddly, Congress by statute or the President by executive order has, since 1947, author-
ized Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Samoa to conduct local elections without con-
sidering the Article III issues involved. As discussed below, the federal government’s actions in 
that regard are not precedent here because an Indian reservation is not a “territory.” See infra 
notes 155–63 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 101. Section 904 does not grant tribal court judges any form of tenure or any salary, let 
alone provide life tenure or protect what salary they receive from diminution. Accordingly, Sec-
tion 904 would not make tribal judges Article III judges. Compare U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
 102. The Senate bill is silent regarding who is authorized to imprison an offender, so pre-
sumably the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 will govern that subject. That law authorizes sever-
al places of confinement: (1) a tribal correctional center approved by the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs for long-term incarceration; (2) the nearest appropriate Federal facility; (3) a state or local 
government-approved detention or correctional center; or (4) an alternative rehabilitation cen-
ter of an Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(d)(1)(A)–(D) (2012). For present purposes, what matters 
is that it is federal law that justifies confinement of an offender pursuant to a judgment entered 
by a tribal judge. 
 103. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169 (1994) (“The parties do not dispute that 
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It follows then, that tribal judges must be appointed in the man-
ner identified in Article II. Yet that is where the Senate bill falls short, 
because neither the President nor any other entity designated in Arti-
cle II is involved in either appointing or removing tribal judges. The 
tribes themselves select their judges.104 Either (and certainly both) of 
those shortcomings is enough to doom the Senate bill.105 There have 
been various arguments advanced in favor of limiting a President’s 
removal power, and on occasion, the Supreme Court has found those 
arguments persuasive.106 The Court has never, however, ruled that 
the President, a court of law, and the head of a department can all be 
ousted from the appointment and removal process entirely. Were that 
ever the case, the result would be that no one could be held legally or 
politically accountable for whatever intentional misconduct, negli-
 
military judges, because of the authority and responsibilities they possess, act as ‘Officers’ of the 
United States.”). See also Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (concluding that special trial 
judges of the Tax Court are officers); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (“[A]ny appointee 
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the 
United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by [the Appoint-
ments Clause.]”). 
 104. The selection process varies from tribe to tribe: 
The education and selection of tribal court judges is as varied as the tribes them-
selves. Many tribal councils appoint judges to serve for discrete terms. Some tribes 
choose tribal judges by popular election. Some tribes use a mixed system; the tribal 
council of the Navajo tribe, for example, which has jurisdiction over close to half of 
the Indian population subject to tribal courts, appoints its judges for terms of two or 
three years. If, at the end of that period, the tribal council affirms the appointment, 
the judge serves for life. 
Wright, supra note 33, at 1403. 
 105. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658 (1997) (“Under the Appoint-
ments Clause, Congress could not give the Judge Advocates General power to ‘appoint’ even 
inferior officers of the United States; that power can be conferred only upon the President, de-
partment heads, and courts of law.”). 
 106. In Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison the Court upheld, against an Appointments 
Clause challenge, legislation that restricted the ability of the President to remove an officer ex-
cept for good cause. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. Unit-
ed States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see also Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (allowing a 
claim for wrongful removal of a War Claims Commission by the President); United States v. 
Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (upholding a restriction on the removal authority of an inferior 
officer). The Court has not detailed the justifications that constitute “good cause,” but miscon-
duct (e.g., consistently not showing up for work) and incompetence (e.g., consistently doing no 
work) would be grounds for dismissal under any reasonable construction of that term. For in-
stance, Humphrey’s Executor upheld a restriction on the President’s power to remove members 
of the Federal Trade Commission, who held seven-year terms and could not be removed by the 
President except for “‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’” 295 U.S. at 620 
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 41); see also Weiner, 357 U.S. at 356 (“We have not a removal for cause in-
volving the rectitude of a member of an adjudicatory body.”). 
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gent defaults, or simple mistakes are made by a federal official. The 
Framers did not intend to turn the federal government loose on the 
public by vesting federal authority in the hands of parties who are 
neither properly selected at the outset, nor capable of being held le-
gally or politically accountable later on.107 In fact, the Supreme 
Court has held unconstitutional the delegation of standardless rule-
making authority to private parties who, unlike legislators and execu-
tive branch officers, are neither legally nor politically accountable to 
the electorate or to other government officials.108 But, that is precise-
ly the scenario the Senate bill would create. 
Congress also cannot turn elsewhere for authority to vest tribal 
courts with criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. For example, 
Congress cannot rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to justify 
noncompliance with the requirements of the Appointments Clause. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Freytag v. Comm’r: “Despite Con-
gress’ authority to create offices and to provide for the method of ap-
pointment to those offices, ‘Congress’ power . . . is inevitably bound-
ed by the express language of Article II, cl. 2, and unless the method it 
 
 107. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883–84: 
  The “manipulation of official appointments” had long been one of the Ameri-
can revolutionary generation’s greatest grievances against executive power, see G. 
Wood, The Creation of The American Republic 1776–1787, p. 79 (1969) (Wood), 
because “the power of appointment to offices” was deemed “the most insidious and 
powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism.” Id. at 143. Those who framed 
our Constitution addressed these concerns by carefully husbanding the appointment 
power to limit its diffusion. Although the debate on the Appointments Clause was 
brief, the sparse record indicates the Framers’ determination to limit the distribution 
of the power of appointment. The Constitutional Convention rejected Madison’s 
complaint that the Appointments Clause did “not go far enough if it be necessary at 
all”: Madison argued that “Superior Officers below Heads of Departments ought in 
some cases to have the appointment of the lesser offices.” 2 Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, pp. 627–628 (M. Farrand rev. 1966). The Framers understood, 
however, that by limiting the appointment power, they could ensure that those who 
wielded it were accountable to political force and the will of the people. Thus, the 
Clause bespeaks a principle of limitation by dividing the power to appoint the prin-
cipal federal officers—ambassadors, ministers, heads of departments, and judges—
between the Executive and Legislative Branches. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 129–131. 
Even with respect to “inferior Officers,” the Clause allows Congress only limited au-
thority to devolve appointment power on the President, his heads of departments, 
and the courts of law. 
 108. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Eubank v. City of Rich-
mond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); 
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); see also City of 
Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (noting and distinguishing the Eubank 
and Roberge cases without criticizing them or suggesting that they no longer are good law). 
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provides comports with the latter, the holders of those offices will not 
be ‘Officers of the United States.’”109 Moreover, Congress cannot 
evade Article II by invoking its authority under the Article IV Proper-
ty Clause to regulate conduct occurring on Indian property.110 A sim-
ilar argument was advanced in Metropolitan. Washington Airport Au-
thority. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise.111 That case 
involved the constitutionality of legislation, the Transfer Act,112 that 
sought to confer federal government authority over two Washington 
D.C. area airports on the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authori-
ty (MWAA). The transfer, however, was contingent on the creation of 
a board of directors that had veto authority over MWAA’s actions 
and that included members of Congress.113 The Court concluded 
that the membership and veto provisions of the act granted individual 
members of Congress federal authority that could be exercised only 
by a properly appointed federal officer.114 The Court then turned to 
the question of whether Congress was subject to the Appointments 
Clause requirements when exercising its authority under Article IV 
or could condition the transfer of authority on creation of the board 
of directors contemplated by the Transfer Act. The Court expressly 
rejected that argument, ruling that Congress cannot negotiate away 
Appointments Clause dictates. 
The question is whether the maintenance of federal control over 
the airports by means of the Board of Review, which is allegedly a 
federal instrumentality, is invalid, not because it invades any state 
power, but because Congress’ continued control violates the separa-
tion-of-powers principle, the aim of which is to protect not the 
States but “the whole people from improvident laws.”115  
That rationale would apply here, too. 
IV. Article III Issues Raised by Senate Bill 1925 
The Article II flaws in the Senate bill are sufficient to sink it, but 
 
 109. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138–39). 
 110. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 249–51 (1901). 
 111. Metro. Wash. Airport Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 
252 (1991). 
 112. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2456 (1988). 
 113. Metro. Wash. Airport Auth., 501 U.S. at 258–59. 
 114. Id. at 265–70. 
 115. Id. at 271 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)). 
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they are not the only problematic aspect of the bill. By empowering 
tribal courts to adjudicate federal criminal prosecutions that arise un-
der federal law, the Senate bill raises an additional, distinct set of is-
sues, ones that would be present even if tribal court judges were ap-
pointed in full compliance with the Article II appointment process. 
Numerous officials in the Executive Branch are appointed in that 
manner, but they cannot enter a judgment that authorizes the incar-
ceration of a person for breaking a rule. Administrative agencies, for 
example, can adjudicate license applications (e.g., the FCC), can de-
cide whether certain products, such as pesticides, can be distributed 
in interstate commerce (e.g., the EPA), or can decide whether the 
commercial conduct of a regulated party violated one of its rules, as 
well as whether that person should receive a sanction of some type 
for noncompliance (e.g., the SEC). Congress does not, however, 
grant administrative agencies the power to adjudicate criminal charg-
es and imprison convicted offenders. Generally speaking, only Article 
III courts can enter judgments with that effect.116 The Senate VAWA 
bill therefore raises Article III issues that must be addressed separate-
ly.117 
A. The Importance of Judicial Independence 
Any discussion of Article III must start with what makes it unique 
in our constitutional scheme. Article III of the Constitution creates 
the federal judiciary, but also does far more than merely establish a 
bench within the federal government. Unlike Articles I and II, which 
create positions held for only two, four, or six years, Article III affords 
federal judges life tenure.118  
Moreover, in order to prevent evasion of that guarantee, Article 
III also grants federal judges protection against a reduction in their 
 
 116. See infra note 146. 
 117. For a discussion of the analogous Article III issues raised by the assignment of judi-
cial power to an international tribunal, see John C. Harrison, International Adjudicators and Judi-
cial Independence, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 127 (2006). 
 118. The Judicial Vesting and Good Behavior Clauses of the U.S. Constitution  provides 
as follows: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during 
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
  
1]           VAWA, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, and Indian Tribal Courts 
 25 
salary. Together, those aspects of this provision appear to have a sim-
ple, straightforward meaning viz., whatever judicial power the United 
States may have must be lodged in supreme or inferior courts that 
will be filled by parties who enjoy tenure and salary protections. The 
apparent rationale for those protections is to guarantee the independ-
ence of federal judges.119 
That straightforward interpretation makes sense as a matter of 
history. The Framers had the utmost concern for the independence of 
the judiciary. As colonists during the reign of King George III, the 
Framers had experienced firsthand the unholy alliance of judges and 
the executive. The Framers believed that it was necessary to afford 
judges protection against removal or impoverishment were they to 
decide a case against the government or public opinion. Only by af-
fording judges those safeguards, the Framers thought, would courts 
be able to play their constitutionally assigned role of standing be-
tween a potentially autocratic or overweening government and indi-
vidual citizens.120 Not surprisingly, Supreme Court precedent con-
firms the evident meaning of the text and the judgment of history. As 
the Court recently explained in Stern v. Marshal,121Article III is es-
sential to the Constitution’s checks and balances, and therefore pro-
hibits sharing the judicial power between the judiciary and the other 
branches.122 
 
 119. See William R. Castro, If Men Were Angels, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 663, 666 
(2012) (“The Founders believed that government abuse could be limited by separating the 
powers of government into three co-equal branches and that the judicial branch would curb 
misconduct by the legislative and the executive branches. An important part of the judiciary’s 
participation in this balance of powers scheme was the power to refuse to give effect to uncon-
stitutional misconduct by the other branches through judicial review. Finally, the power of judi-
cial review would be significantly less effective if the other branches could effectively control 
the judiciary. Hence arose the need for judicial independence.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 122. See id. at 2608–09; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1957); United States ex rel. 
Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15–16 (1955). As the Court explained in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. 
Ct. 2594 (2011): 
  As its text and our precedent confirm, Article III is “an inseparable element of 
the constitutional system of checks and balances” that “both defines the power and 
protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.” Under “the basic concept of sepa-
ration of powers . . . that flow[s] from the scheme of a tripartite government” adopt-
ed in the Constitution, “the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ . . . can no more be 
shared” with another branch than “the Chief Executive, for example, can share with 
the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to 
override a Presidential veto.” 
  In establishing the system of divided power in the Constitution, the Framers 
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B. Article I and Article III Courts 
The simple terms of Article III, however, belie a far more compli-
cated history than its text suggests.123 The Supreme Court has held 
in several different contexts that Congress may vest in other courts, 
known as “Article I courts,” the authority to adjudicate rights and re-
sponsibilities of parties to a dispute even if judges who lack life tenure 
and salary protection enjoyed by Article III judges preside over those 
courts.124 The existence of these different exceptions to the general 
 
considered it essential that “the judiciary remain[] truly distinct from both the legis-
lature and the executive.” As Hamilton put it, quoting Montesquieu, “‘there is no 
liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive 
powers.’” 
. . . . 
  Article III protects liberty not only through its role in implementing the separa-
tion of powers, but also by specifying the defining characteristics of Article III judg-
es. The colonists had been subjected to judicial abuses at the hand of the Crown, and 
the Framers knew the main reasons why: because the King of Great Britain “made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount 
and payment of their salaries.” The Framers undertook in Article III to protect citi-
zens subject to the judicial power of the new Federal Government from a repeat of 
those abuses. By appointing judges to serve without term limits, and restricting the 
ability of the other branches to remove judges or diminish their salaries, the Framers 
sought to ensure that each judicial decision would be rendered, not with an eye to-
ward currying favor with Congress or the Executive, but rather with the “[c]lear 
heads . . . and honest hearts” deemed “essential to good judges.” 
  Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of checks and balances 
nor preserve the integrity of judicial decision-making if the other branches of the 
Federal Government could confer the Government’s “judicial Power” on entities 
outside Article III. That is why we have long recognized that, in general, Congress 
may not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the 
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” When a suit is made 
of “the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westmin-
ster in 1789,” and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsi-
bility for deciding that suit rests with Article III judges in Article III courts. The 
Constitution assigns that job—resolution of “the mundane as well as the glamorous, 
matters of common law and statute as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well 
as issues of law”—to the Judiciary. 
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608–09 (citations omitted). 
 123. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 888–89 (1991) (“The text of the Clause does 
not limit the ‘Courts of Law’ to those courts established under Article III of the Constitution. 
The Appointments Clause does not provide that Congress can vest appointment power only in 
‘one supreme Court’ and other courts established under Article III, or only in tribunals that 
exercise broad common-law jurisdiction.”). 
 124. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407–08 (1973) (“It is apparent that nei-
ther this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question aris-
ing under the federal law, or even every criminal prosecution for violating an Act of Congress, 
to be tried in an Art. III court before a judge enjoying lifetime tenure and protection against 
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rule set forth in Article II complicates the question of whether Con-
gress can vest Indian tribal courts with criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. At a minimum, it makes curious the fact that neither the ma-
jority nor dissenting Judiciary Committee reports even addressed the 
issue. 
1. Territorial courts 
The first exception involves the territories of the United States. 
Several of the original thirteen colonies and states laid claim to unset-
tled land west of the Appalachian Mountains, and disputes over the 
sovereign right to those lands was a contentious issue before the 
Constitution was adopted.125 Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution 
sought to deal with that power by vesting in the federal government 
the authority to admit new states into the unions and to regulate the 
“[t]erritory” of the United States.126 Early on, the question arose 
whether the Constitution required Congress to vest the courts that 
Congress established in those territories with the same “judicial pow-
er” set forth in Article III that was given to the federal courts in the 
new nation, as well as to guarantee the judges appointed to sit on the 
bench in those courts with the same tenure and salary protections en-
joyed by federal judges in the states. From the beginning, the Court’s 
answer was “no.” The leading case is American Insurance Co. v. 356 
Bales of Cotton.127 There, Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that 
Congress could create “legislative courts” in the territories that did 
 
salary reduction. Rather, both Congress and this Court have recognized that state courts are 
appropriate forums in which federal questions and federal crimes may at times be tried; and that 
the requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of national applicability and affairs 
of national concern are at stake, must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plena-
ry grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particular-
ized needs and warranting distinctive treatment.”). 
 125. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 249–51 (1901) (discussing that history). 
 126. The New States Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, provides 
as follows:  
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall 
be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be 
formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Con-
sent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. 
The Property Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1, provides as fol-
lows: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this 
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any 
particular State.” 
 127. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
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not possess the same jurisdictional, life tenure, and salary-protection 
features as Article III courts.128 The Court has followed that decision 
for more than a century since then, in both civil and criminal cases 
alike.129 
2. Military courts-martial 
The second example is the use of a court-martial in the mili-
tary.130 Article I empowers Congress “[t]o make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”131 To main-
tain discipline within the services, Congress has created the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, which serves as the military criminal 
code.132 Congress also has created a judicial system for the trial and 
review of criminal charges against servicemembers.133 Military offic-
ers serve as judges (and juries) at the trial and intermediate appellate 
 
 128. Id. at 546. 
 129. See ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 453 (1929); City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453 
(1879); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434 (1872); Coe v. United States, 155 U.S. 76 (1894); 
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877); Hornbuckle v. 
Toombs, 85 U.S. 648 (1873); McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891); Palmore v. Unit-
ed States, 411 U.S. 389, 397–404 (1973); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 477 (1899); see also Bal-
zac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (stating that courts created by Congress in Puerto 
Rico are legislative courts); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (favorably discuss-
ing Canter); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 422 (1907) (courts created by Congress in Indian 
Country are legislative courts); cf. Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235 (1850) (supporting the 
assertion that once a territory is admitted to the union as a state, Congress no longer can regu-
late it as a territory). 
There is the additional complication that not all territories are alike. Some are deemed 
part of the United States, and the Constitution applies there. Others are not so fortunate. The 
Constitution itself does not apply, but there is a residual due process guarantee that does. Com-
pare Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (the territory of Alaska was incorporated 
into the United States), with Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (the territory of Puerto 
Rico was not incorporated into the United States); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) 
(the territory of the Philippines was not incorporated into the United States). Whether those 
cases, known as the Insular Cases, are still good law is unclear. Compare Examining Bd. of Archi-
tects, Engrs. & Surveyors v. Flores do Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (stating in dicta that the Insu-
lar Cases no longer are good law), with United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) 
(dictum that the Insular Cases are still good law). For an excellent discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s territorial cases, see Lawson, supra note 99. 
 130. And its fraternal twin, the military tribunal. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 
(1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). 
 131. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 132. See, e.g., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 438–39 (1987). 
 133. For a description of the military criminal justice system, see Weiss v. United States, 
510 U.S. 163 (1994). 
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levels,134 and they lack the tenure and salary protections enjoyed by 
Article III judges.135 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held, al-
most without exception,136 that service members may be tried by a 
court-martial for any crime committed while they are in the military 
if they are charged while still in the service.137 The “military status of 
the accused” is the only fact necessary to confer jurisdiction on a 
court-martial.138 
3. District of Columbia courts 
A third exception applies to the courts of the District of Colum-
bia. Just as the Constitution gave Congress authority to regulate ter-
ritories acquired by the fledgling nation by virtue of the Article IV 
Property Clause,139 the Constitution also granted Congress similar 
authority over the District of Columbia pursuant to the Article I En-
 
 134. The highest court in the military justice system is the Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces, which consists of civilians appointed for a fixed term of office. See Clinton v. 
Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999); United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 
http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/home.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2012). All other mili-
tary judges are officers in one of the services. See Weiss 510 U.S. at 169 (1994). 
 135. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S.  178  (“Although a fixed term of office is a tradi-
tional component of the Anglo-American civilian judicial system, it has never been a part of the 
military justice tradition. The early English military tribunals, which served as the model for 
our own military justice system, were historically convened and presided over by a military gen-
eral. No tenured military judge presided.”). 
 136. In 1969, in an opinion for the Court authored by Justice Douglas, the Supreme 
Court imposed a new restriction on court-martial jurisdiction, limiting it to only those charges 
that were “service-connected,” a term that the Court did not define. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 
395 U.S. 258 (1969). In Solorio v. United States, the Court concluded that the historical analysis 
in O’Callahan was mistaken and that the “service-connection” test was unworkable. 483 U.S. 
435, 438–51 (1987). The Court therefore overruled O’Callahan. Id. at 436. 
 137. See Solorio, 483 U.S. 435; Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1973) (plurality opin-
ion); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240–41, 243 (1960); McElroy v. 
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1957) (plurality opinion); United States ex rel. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955); Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11, 20–21 (1921); Kahn v. Anderson, 
255 U.S. 1, 6–9 (1921); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 
158 U.S. 109, 114 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 183–85 (1886); Coleman v. Tennes-
see, 97 U.S. 509, 513–14 (1879); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866); Dynes v. 
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857); American Articles of War of 1776, Section XVIII, Article 
5, reprinted in 2 W. Winthrop Military Law & Precedents 1503 (2d ed. 1896). 
 138. Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439. 
 139. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States . . . .” 
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clave Clause.140 In each instance, Congress can exercise the authority 
of a state legislature, rather than the national legislature, and so can 
create courts that lack the tenure and salary protections enjoyed by 
Article III courts.141 
4. Administrative agencies 
The last example can be seen in administrative agencies. Numer-
ous agencies exist today with the legal authority to promulgate regu-
lations, to initiate legal proceedings, and to adjudicate disputes. The 
Interstate Commerce Commission was one of the first federal admin-
istrative agencies with adjudicative authority, but there are numerous 
others today. The Supreme Court has not required that Congress use 
only Article III courts to adjudicate disputes of what the court has 
termed “public rights,” that is, rights that exist only because Congress 
has created them by statute.142 Congress, the Court has held, can 
empower administrative agencies to handle such adjudications in the 
first instance.143 
C. The Proposed Expansion of Indian Tribal Court  
Jurisdiction and Article III 
Despite those exceptions, the decision to vest tribal courts with 
authority over non-Indians is problematic under Article III. Congress 
has not given tribal court judges life tenure, nor has Congress pro-
 
 140. The Enclave Clause states that: 
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not ex-
ceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance 
of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exer-
cise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the 
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, 
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings[.] 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 141. See City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1880); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 434, 447 (1872); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 655–656 (1874); McAl-
lister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 180–184 (1891); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 
(1973); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1879); Romeu v. Todd, 206 U.S. 358, 369 
(1907); United States v. McMillan, 165 U.S. 504, 510 (1897).     
 142. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585–89 (1985); 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50, 53 (1932); cf. Util. Workers v. Consol. Edison, Co., 309 U.S. 
261, 264–65 (1940) (Congress may establish administrative agencies to enforce statutory rights). 
 143. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 454–55 (1977); Crowell v. Ben-
son, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272 (1856); Thomas, 473 U.S. 568. 
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tected their salaries from diminution, the two cardinal features of an 
Article III court judge.144 The Senate VAWA bill does not change 
that state of affairs. Accordingly, vesting criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians in tribal courts can be defended only on the ground that 
one of the above Article III exceptions applies. The problem is that 
none of these exceptions is applicable here.145  
Start with the easy ones. First: Tribal courts are not military 
courts-martial. A court-martial can sentence a defendant to prison, 
but their jurisdiction is limited to servicemembers.146 Moreover, trib-
al courts are not part of the military justice system.147 Second: Like 
courts-martial, the District of Columbia courts can sentence an of-
fender to prison, but the District of Columbia is a unique feature of 
the Constitution, geographically and structurally.148 That exception 
cannot reasonably be extended to reach tribal criminal jurisdiction in 
Arizona. Third: Tribal courts are not administrative agencies. Even if 
they were, agencies lack criminal jurisdiction and therefore cannot 
sentence a person to imprisonment, so this exception is inapplica-
ble.149 Accordingly, the only exception that could apply is the one for 
 
 144. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New 
Bankruptcy Courts Are Unconstitutional, 70 Geo. L.J. 297, 299 (1981). 
 145. The President or the Head of a Department, in compliance with the Article II Ap-
pointments Clause, appoints military officers, judges in the District of Columbia courts, and 
Superior Officers at administrative agencies. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 
(1986); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 653–58 (1997) (Coast Guard Court of Military 
Appeals); Palmore, 411 U.S. at 392–93 (District of Columbia court judges); Weiss v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 163, 168 & n.2 (1994) (military officers). The president does not appoint tribal 
court judges. See supra note 33. The problems with the Senate VAWA bill created by Article III 
also exist under Article II. For convenience, however, we will generally refer only to Article III 
in this discussion. 
 146. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 802–03 (2012) (listing parties subject to the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice). 
 147. See id. § 801(10) (“[t]he term ‘military judge’ means an official of a general or special 
court-martial detailed in accordance with [10 U.S.C. §] 826 . . . .”); id. § 826 (identifying judges 
who may preside over courts-martial for purpose of the Uniform Code of Military Justice). 
 148. See supra notes 134–35. 
 149. Administrative agencies lack authority to enter a judgment holding unconstitutional 
an act of Congress. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974); Oestereich v. Selec-
tive Serv. Sys. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); PUC v. United States, 355 
U.S. 534, 539 (1958). If so it certainly would be odd to allow an Indian tribal court to issue a 
judgment with that effect. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the United States 
cannot appeal to the Supreme Court, or to any other federal court, from such a judgment. Cir-
cuit courts have jurisdiction over final decisions entered by district courts, not tribal courts. 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the judgments of federal 
circuit courts and state courts of last resort. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006). Tribal courts are nei-
ther. If tribal courts can exercise even limited criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, that oddity 
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territorial courts. 
The Supreme Court case law dealing with territories gives new 
meaning to the term “ipse dixit.” As Professor Gary Lawson has ex-
plained, the Supreme Court’s decisions construing Congress’ au-
thority to govern territories make no effort to square the mechanisms 
that Congress has chosen for territorial governance with the text of 
Articles II and III.150 The lesson of the Court’s territorial courts cases 
appears to be that Congress can act as if it were a state legislature 
when it seeks to regulate a territory.151 The Court’s doctrine allows 
Congress to establish territorial courts lacking the Article III protec-
tions that the Framers thought necessary for the judiciary to remain 
independent.152 In fact, the Court’s decisions, beginning with Chief 
Justice Marshall’s 1828 opinion in American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales 
of Cotton,153 have granted Congress authority to regulate territories 
and their local governments as if Article III did not exist, despite the 
Framers’ efforts to use this provision carefully to circumscribe the 
power that Congress otherwise may exercise.154 
The supporters of the Senate VAWA bill likely would point to 
this body of law to defend the extension of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion to the tribal courts. According to this argument, those decisions 
enable Congress to do precisely what Section 904 of Senate Bill 1925 
seeks to do: empower tribal courts to adjudicate cases and sentence 
convicted offenders to prison for a narrow category of crimes that 
tribes have a surpassing interest in punishing.155 This limited expan-
sion of tribal court jurisdiction, the argument would continue, meas-
urably contributes to a tribe’s ability to engage in the self-governance 
that any autonomous polity finds essential by enabling tribes to han-
dle matters of critical local concern. Finally, allowing tribal courts to 
handle crimes involving domestic violence does not encroach on the 
power of the federal or state courts. On the contrary, the argument 
 
may occur. 
 150. See Lawson, supra note 99, at 888–94, 907–08. 
 151. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). 
 152. See Lawson, supra note 99, at 878–94. Congress also has authorized territorial inhab-
itants to elect government officials themselves, which would appear to be a clear violation of the 
Article II Appointments Clause. Id. at 894–905. 
 153. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). 
 154. See Lawson, supra note 99, at 871–911. 
 155. See Rob Hotakainen, Tribes Want New Powers to Prosecute Non-Indians, McClatchy 
Newspapers, Aug. 12, 2012, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/08/12/161534 
/tribes-want-new-powers-to-prosecute.html. 
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would conclude, the Senate VAWA bill avoids adding to their already-
heavy caseloads. Federal and state courts, therefore, would welcome 
having tribal courts serve as alternative forums for these cases. 
The strength of that argument lies in its facial reasonableness and 
practical usefulness. The Senate VAWA bill offers a sensible solution 
to a serious tribal problem that accommodates all of the competing 
interests without stepping on anyone’s toes. The argument also leans 
towards affording tribal courts the same type of respect that the Su-
preme Court has often indicated that state courts deserve as compe-
tent, reliable, and honorable adjudicators.156 To borrow Professor 
Lawson’s colorful words, the formalistic approach envisioned by Arti-
cle III appears to be “one of constitutionally mandated colonialism, 
which is not likely to go over well at cocktail parties, legal symposia, 
or congressional committee hearings.”157 
However reasonable that argument may appear, ultimately it is 
unpersuasive. Under current Supreme Court case law, when Congress 
acts as a state legislature to regulate a “territory,” it has latitude to 
create governmental structures that would not satisfy the Article III 
requirements applicable when Congress acts as the national legisla-
ture. Nonetheless, there is a limit as to how far the Supreme Court’s 
territorial cases can be stretched. After all, as a matter of logic the 
same decisions that lift the constraints of Article III when Congress 
acts as a state legislature would also justify erasing the constraints 
placed on Congress in Article I. The result would be that Congress 
could legislate without regard to the Article I Presentment Clause re-
quirement that all bills be forwarded to the President for his signa-
ture or veto.158 Congress could also ignore the Article I prohibition 
on passing Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto laws as well as disre-
gard the guarantees in the Bill of Rights, such as the Eighth Amend-
ment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.159 Yet, it is inconceiv-
able that the Supreme Court would allow Congress to act as a 
modern day committee of public safety or to pass a territorial law ret-
 
 156. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 
(1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
 157. Lawson, supra note 99, at 908 (emphasis in original). 
 158. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (a one-house 
veto is unconstitutional); Process Gas Consumers Grp. v. Consumers Energy Council, 463 U.S. 
1216 (1983) (same result for a two-house veto). 
 159. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
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roactively criminalizing innocent conduct, branding a specific person 
as a felon, and punishing him with being boiled in oil. But if that is 
true, then Articles I, II, and III, as well as the Constitution’s amend-
ments, to some extent must limit Congress’ power to regulate a terri-
tory. The question then becomes, “How much of a limitation is 
there?” 
Reasonable people can disagree on how far Congress can go in 
regulating a territory.160 But there should be unanimity on one point; 
the Supreme Court’s territorial court precedents apply only when the 
polity involved is a “[t]erritory” within the meaning of the Property 
Clause of Article IV. Otherwise, in the absence of some other excep-
tion, the Court’s decisions require Congress to legislate only in com-
pliance with Article III. 
This should be dispositive here, because a “reservation” is not a 
“[t]erritory.” When the Framers used that term in Article IV, they 
likely had the Northwest Territories in mind, which the thirteen col-
onies acquired from Great Britain along with their freedom.161 That 
term was later also used to describe the Louisiana Territory, pur-
chased from France in 1803, and other western lands, such as the Or-
 
 160. For example, it could be said that granting tribal courts criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians is beyond Congress’ reach. That argument would go as follows: The authority to 
punish someone for a crime is the most intrusive of government acts. Oliphant exhaustively can-
vassed the law governing the relationship between the federal government and the tribes, and 
the Court concluded that federal law never contemplated that tribes may exercise criminal ju-
risdiction over non-Indians. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). As 
explained in the text, if Congress cannot authorize torture as the punishment for domestic vio-
lence, Congress cannot force a defendant to be tried before a judge whose tenure and salary 
rests in the hands of a political community from which the defendant is excluded due to his 
race. If Congress wants to change that rule of law, the argument concludes, it may do so, but it 
must comply with Articles II and III in the process. 
The problem with that argument, however, is that, as recently as 1973, the Supreme 
Court has upheld Congress’ decision to vest non-Article III courts with criminal jurisdiction in 
the District of Columbia and the territorial courts. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 
389 (1973). Whatever the merits of that argument as an original matter—and, as Professor 
Lawson has noted, it is far more faithful to the text of the Constitution than are the Court’s 
precedents—that argument has an uphill climb given the Court’s decisions. 
 161. See Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 42 (1890) (“[T]he territory north-
west of the Ohio River . . . belonged to the United States at the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. . . .”). In fact, it is possible that the Framers thought that the term “territory” would refer 
exclusively to the Northwest Territories, because there was a significant debate over whether 
President Jefferson had authority to purchase the Louisiana Territory. See Downes v. Bidwell, 
182 U.S. 244, 252 (1901) (“It is well known that Mr. Jefferson entertained grave doubts as to his 
power to make the purchase, or, rather, as to his right to annex the territory and make it part of 
the United States . . . .”). 
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egon Territory.162 Like the land forming the original thirteen states, 
the federal government acquired that territory by treaty (France, 
Great Britain, and Spain), conquest (Spain), or both (Spain).163 In the 
same way, the United States acquired a property right in the land 
claimed by the tribes who lived there. Under the “Conquest Theory” 
of property acquisition, each western nation that discovered and laid 
claim to a portion of the Western Hemisphere became sovereign over 
that land, regardless of the presence of an indigenous population.164 
By acquiring land from Great Britain, France, and Spain, the United 
States acquired the same rights that those nations had enjoyed.165 In 
the process, the federal government simply ignored the aboriginal ti-
tle that the tribes claimed to the land now forming the United States. 
However it acquired land beyond the thirteen states, the United 
States possessed the same authority over those territories that any na-
tion would enjoy over land under its control. 
“Reservations” came into being in a different way. A reservation is 
 
 162. See Mormon Church, 136 U.S. at 142 (“The territory of Louisiana, when acquired 
from France, and the territories west of the Rocky Mountains, when acquired from Mexico, 
became the absolute property and domain of the United States, subject to such conditions as 
the government, in its diplomatic negotiations, had seen fit to accept relating to the rights of 
the people then inhabiting those territories.”); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 
587 (1823). The United States purchased the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803. The 
United States acquired the land, called the Mexican Succession, forming all or part of ten west-
ern states by virtue of the treaty ending the Mexican War. The United States later bought land 
from Mexico, an exchange called the Gadsden Purchase, in present-day Arizona and New Mex-
ico to build a transcontinental railroad and to reconcile some outstanding territorial issues from 
the Mexican War. The United States acquired the Oregon Territory by virtue of settlement and 
treaties with France, Spain, and Great Britain. See Act of August 14, 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 
329 (1848); the Treaty of Boundary, Cession of Territory, Transfer of Isthmus of Tehuantepec 
(Gadsden Purchase Treaty), U.S.-Mex., Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031; Treaty of Peace, Friend-
ship, Limits, and Settlement Guadalupe-Hidalgo US-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 926 (1852); 
Richardson v. Ainsa, 218 U.S. 289, 295 (1910); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 50 (1894); Botiller 
v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889); GAO, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo GAO-04-59, at 
27–33 (June 2004); Samuel Eliot Morrison, The Oxford History of the American Peo-
ple 538–47, 559–65, 567, 604 (1965). 
 163. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 268; Mormon Church, 136 U.S. at 42. 
 164. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589 (“The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by 
force. The conqueror prescribes its limits.”). 
 165. For a discussion of the Conquest Theory, see Downes, 182 U.S. at 300–05 (Brown, J., 
concurring); Mormon Church, 136 U.S. at 42; United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. 414, 434 
(1872) (collecting authorities); Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 
(1828); Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572–92; cf. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894) (“Upon the ac-
quisition of a Territory by the United States, whether by cession from one of the States, or by 
treaty with a foreign country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title and dominion 
passed to the United States, for the benefit of the whole people, and in trust for the several 
States to be ultimately created out of the Territory.”). 
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not acquired by the United States from a foreign nation through 
force or by purchase. Rather, under “the accepted meaning of the 
term,” a “reservation” is a “distinct tract” of land held in fee simple 
by the United States that is set aside or “reserved” for the “occupan-
cy” and use of a tribe by virtue of a treaty with the United States, a 
statute, or an executive order.166 Reservations became necessary to 
avoid conflict as settlers moved west in pursuit of land that the tribes 
claimed as part of their heritage, but that the federal government 
claimed by virtue of its status as sovereign.167 Indeed, acts of Con-
gress admitting territories into the union as states specifically ex-
empted property that belonged to a tribe by treaty.168 The federal 
government created reservations for the tribes to live separately from 
settlers and to be subject only to federal and tribal governance.169 
Tribal reservations therefore are not the same as the “[t]erritories” 
that the Framers included in Article IV.170 
 
 166. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 737 (1986); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 175 U.S. 
373, 389–90 (1902); United States v. Carpenter, 111 U.S. 347 (1884); Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson, 
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543. As the Supreme Court explained in Spalding v. Chandler: 
It has been settled by repeated adjudications of this court that the fee of the lands in 
this country in the original occupation of the Indian tribes was from the time of the 
formation of this government vested in the United States. The Indian title as against 
the United States was merely a title and right to the perpetual occupancy of the land 
with the privilege of using it in such mode as they saw fit until such right of occupa-
tion had been surrendered to the government. When Indian reservations were creat-
ed, either by treaty or executive order, the Indians held the land by the same charac-
ter of title, to wit, the right to possess and occupy the lands for the uses and purposes 
designated. 
Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U.S. 394, 402–03 (1896). 
 167. Beginning in 1830 with the Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (May 
28, 1830), Congress passed several laws to remove the tribes from east to west of the Mississippi 
and later to allow land to be set aside west of the Mississippi for occupancy by the tribes as 
Americans moved westward to the Pacific. For later federal legislation, see, for example, Gen-
eral Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887); Indian Appropriations Act of 
1851, ch. 14, 9 Stat. 574, 586–87 (1851); the Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, 
ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2012)); see also Corre-
spondence on the Subject of the Emigration of Indians, S. Doc. No. 512 (1834); Sec-
ond Annual Message of President Andrew Jackson to Congress (Dec. 6, 1830), reprinted in 
2 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1908 (James D. 
Richardson ed., 1908). 
 168. E.g., In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 740–41 (1866) (statute admitting Kansas). The 
Indian Appropriations Act of 1851 allotted funds to move tribes into reservations to avoid con-
flict with settlers. 
 169. See L. Bow Pritchett, Comment, Problems of State Jurisdiction over Indian Reservations, 
13 DePaul L. Rev. 74, 74–75 (1963). 
 170. For a discussion of the sui generis history of the relationship between the federal gov-
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Can Congress retroactively change the status that a tribal reserva-
tion enjoys under federal law in order to invest a tribe with the juris-
diction that it might have been able to exercise if the reservation had 
been a territory from the outset?171 The answer is no for several rea-
sons.172 Initially, once a territory becomes a state, Congress loses the 
authority to regulate the state as if it were still a territory.173 Under 
the Equal Footing Doctrine each new state admitted to the union re-
ceives the same legal rights that preexisting states enjoy.174 One of 
those rights is territorial integrity.175 Article IV of the Constitution 
explicitly forbids Congress from carving a new state out of the land of 
an existing state without the latter’s consent.176 Accordingly, Con-
gress cannot wrest land from an existing state for the purpose of cre-
ating a new “territory” for an Indian tribe without the affected state’s 
 
ernment and the tribes, see Frickey, supra note 43; Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: 
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381 
(1993); Charlene Koski, The Legacy of Solem v. Helm: How Courts Have Used Demographics to 
Bypass Congress and Erode the Basic Principles of Indian Law, 83 Wash. L. Rev. 723 (2009). 
 171. Congress thought about that option once. In 1834, “Congress proposed to create an 
Indian territory beyond the western-directed destination of the settlers; the territory was to be 
governed by a confederation of Indian tribes and was expected ultimately to become a State of 
the Union.” Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201–02 (1978). The bill never 
passed. Id. at 202 n.13. 
 172. Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 260–61 (1901) (“This District [of Columbia] 
had been a part of the States of Maryland and Virginia. It had been subject to the Constitution, 
and was a part of the United States. The Constitution had attached to it irrevocably. There are 
steps which can never be taken backward.”). 
 173. See Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242–45 (1850) (once a territory is admit-
ted to the union as a state, Congress can no longer regulate it as a territory). 
 174. See PPL Mont. LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227–28 (2012); United States v. 
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911); Shively v. Bowlby, 
152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). The term “equal footing” comes from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 
It provided that each new state admitted to the union from that territory would enter on an 
“equal footing” with the states that already were members of the republic. See Pollard v. Hagan, 
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222 (1845). 
 175. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361–62 (2001) (“‘Ordinarily,’ it is now clear, ‘an 
Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the State.’” (citation omitted)); United 
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886) (“[T]hese Indians are within the geographical limits 
of the United States. The soil and the people within these limits are under the political control 
of the Government of the United States, or of the states of the Union. There exists within the 
broad domain of sovereignty but these two. There may be cities, counties, and other organized 
bodies, with limited legislative functions, but they are all derived from, or exist in, subordination 
to one or the other of these.”); accord Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211 
(1978); cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“The Indian territory is 
admitted to compose a part of the United States. In all our maps, geographical treatises, histo-
ries, and laws, it is so considered.”). 
 176. See supra note 126 (quoting the New States and Property Clauses, art. IV, § 3, cl. 1). 
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approval.177 The upshot of this process is that Congress cannot regu-
late tribal court jurisdiction for a reservation within one of the states 
by invoking its authority to create Article I courts for territories. Put 
differently, the Constitution prohibits Congress from treating a res-
ervation as if it were a territory if that reservation lies within the bor-
ders of any of the fifty states. 
Congress may be able to skip over some Article III requirements 
when legislating for a territory, but it cannot escape those restrictions 
by virtue of the fiction that “reservations” are “territories.” None of 
the Supreme Court’s 19th or 20th century decisions makes that fic-
tion a fact. Those decisions give Congress expansive power to regu-
late a territory, but do not allow Congress to label as a “territory” 
land that clearly is not. The term “[t]erritory” both defines and limits 
the reach of Congress’ power, and, like the other terms in that docu-
ment, the courts, not Congress, have the ultimate authority to define 
its meaning.178 Congress, therefore, cannot make a “reservation” into 
a “territory” by fiat. Stated differently, even if Congress can call an 
apple an orange for some purposes, Congress can’t change the nature 
of the fruit. The result is that the Supreme Court’s territorial deci-
sions are inapposite here because a “reservation” is not, and cannot be 
made into, a “territory.”179 
It always is possible that the Supreme Court could create a new 
Article III exception for Indian tribal courts as a way to uphold the 
 
 177. And even if Congress could, the Senate VAWA bill does not purport to have that ef-
fect. 
 178. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598–2600 (2012) 
(the meaning of the term “tax” for purposes of the Direct Taxes Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 4, is for the courts, not Congress to define); see also New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 91 (1816) (a “territory” is not a “state” for purposes of Article III); Hepburn & Dundas 
v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 45 (1805) (the “District of Columbia” is not a “state” for purposes of 
Article III).  
 179. Defenders of the Senate bill also might argue that the legislation does not delegate 
authority to the tribes, but simply recognize their inherent authority to prosecute cases against 
non-Indians. Language in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), would support that theory. 
There are two flaws, however, in that argument. The first flaw is precedent. The Supreme 
Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), that Indian tribes lack 
inherent authority to prosecute non-Indians. Congress cannot “recognize” authority that has 
never existed; Congress can only create it. If Congress does, Articles II and III regulate how that 
power can be exercised. The second flaw is logical. Only an act of Congress can enable tribes to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and it should make no difference whether that 
legislation is labeled a “delegation of authority” or a “recognition of inherent authority.” In ei-
ther case only a federal statute would permit a tribal judge to order a convicted defendant im-
prisoned, and that statute is an exercise of Article I authority that can only be accomplished in 
accordance with Articles II and III. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991). 
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constitutionality of a statute like the Senate bill. But it would be diffi-
cult to obscure the fact that any such exception truly would constitute 
an example of constitution-making rather than constitutional inter-
pretation. Neither the text of Article III nor the history of relations 
between the United States and the tribes would support any such ex-
ception, as the Supreme Court noted in Oliphant. The Framers were 
well aware of the existence of Indian tribes and the problem of defin-
ing the relationship between them and the federal or state govern-
ments, so the Court could not justify an exception on the ground that 
Congress today must address a new problem that the Framers could 
not have anticipated. If the Court tried to limit the exception to the 
type of minor crimes anticipated by the Senate bill the Court would 
find itself forced to undertake an undirected and unguided line-
drawing exercise as it tried to identify exactly what offenses may be 
tried by tribal courts. And there is no need for the Court to squander 
its prestige on this enterprise. Congress could vest the federal or state 
courts with jurisdiction over domestic violence on tribal reservations, 
so there is no argument that only tribal courts can address this prob-
lem. Tribes may want the opportunity to address domestic violence in 
their own courts even when non-Indians are defendants, but their de-
sire to adjudicate those cases is entitled to little weight when stacked 
against the concerns that Article III protects.  
V. Conclusion 
Congress is right to be concerned about spousal abuse and other 
forms of domestic violence on Indian reservations. But Congress 
needs to address this problem in a manner that does not leave the so-
lution subject to invalidation under Articles II and III. Congress 
could vest the federal courts with jurisdiction over such offenses, or 
Congress could allow the states to prosecute these crimes in state 
courts. Either approach would avoid the separation-of-powers prob-
lems discussed above. The one avenue that seems closed to Congress, 
however, is precisely the one that the Senate has chosen. However 
Congress decides to address the domestic-violence problem in Indian 
reservations, that action must be done in accordance with Articles II 
and III in a manner that deals with this public policy problem in a 
constitutional manner. The Senate VAWA bill would not help address 
the domestic-violence problem on Indian reservations because an un-
constitutional remedy is no remedy at all. 
